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THE IRS’S VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
PROGRAM: NEED FOR CODIFICATION 
Jay A. Soled* 
ABSTRACT 
For more than a century, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has 
had a voluntary disclosure program in place. Its purpose is to coax 
into tax compliance those wayward taxpayers who have committed 
criminal acts or have been remiss in fulfilling their civic tax-filing 
obligations. Historically, the voluntary disclosure program has had 
to strike a difficult balance between being attractive enough to entice 
tax scofflaws to participate and not being too attractive lest ordinary 
taxpayers feel that their compliance efforts were for naught. 
A unique feature of the voluntary disclosure program is that it is 
entirely administrative in origin. The commissioner of the IRS 
formulated the program and exercises carte blanche as to its terms. 
The program’s administrative origins have allowed it to be nimble 
and responsive to the evolving tax landscape, but such malleability 
has sometimes dissuaded qualified taxpayers from participation 
because they fear that the program’s terms are stacked against them. 
This Article advocates that Congress codify the voluntary 
disclosure program to bolster its appeal. By taking this legislative 
measure, the IRS and taxpayers would have to abide by a set of 
written ground rules. Doing so would curtail both real and perceived 
agency abuses and likely increase the number of derelict taxpayers 
choosing to participate. 
 
* Director of Master of Accountancy in Taxation Program and Professor, Rutgers Business School. 
L.L.M., New York University School of Law; J.D., University of Michigan Law School; B.A., 
Haverford College. The author thanks Richard Sapinski, Esq., and Robert Stern, Esq., for their 
analytical insights and assistance in refining this piece. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the last century, in one form or another, the Treasury 
Department has overseen a voluntary disclosure program.1 The 
historical focus of the program was upon taxpayers who committed 
criminal tax violations; they could seek absolution from the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) if, before being investigated, they approached 
the agency and acknowledged their guilt.2 For noncompliant 
taxpayers, this forgiveness process often came at a steep financial 
cost in terms of additional taxes, penalties, and interest;3 
nevertheless, in many taxpayers’ minds, this price tag has been well 
worth the cost because it negated criminal exposure and possible 
prison time. 
During the twentieth century, the existence of the voluntary 
disclosure program was not well publicized, and its contours were 
amorphous. This was not unexpected: the genesis of the voluntary 
disclosure program was (and remains) entirely administrative in 
nature;4 and thus, with every new IRS commissioner, there came the 
opportunity to curtail, expand, and tweak it.5 Its transient features 
 
 1. See, e.g., Cono R. Namorato & Richard E. Timbie, Voluntary Disclosure Policy: An Alternative 
to Legislative Amnesty, 45 INST. ON FED. TAX’N § 38.01, § 38.02 (1986) (“The Treasury Department has 
followed some form of voluntary disclosure policy since 1919. The policy, which was never formalized 
by statute or regulation, was developed through various informal announcements by Treasury 
officials.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Joseph W. Burns & Murray L. Rachlin, Should We Penalize Voluntary Disclosures?, 
28 TAXES 39, 39 (1950) (“The Bureau has stated that where a taxpayer voluntarily discloses his 
attempted tax evasion to proper Bureau officers before any investigation of him has commenced, it will 
not recommend criminal prosecution.”). 
 3. See IRM 9.5.11.9(6) (Sept. 17, 2020) (“The practice also requires taxpayers to . . . [m]ake good 
faith arrangements with the IRS to pay in full, the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by the IRS 
to be applicable.”). 
 4. See Charles S. Lyon, The Crime of Income Tax Fraud: Its Present Status and Function, 53 
COLUM. L. REV. 476, 492 (1953) (“From the very beginning the whole matter of voluntary disclosure 
was surrounded by uncertainty; it was never explicitly provided for by statute, regulation or any of the 
lesser breed of public communications emanating from the Treasury and Bureau. Nor did the policy 
have even a statutory footing.”). 
 5. In 1952, for example, the secretary of the Treasury Department, John W. Snyder, announced the 
termination of the voluntary disclosure program. I.R.S. News Release S-2930 (Jan. 10, 1952). However, 
in a 1962 news release, Commissioner Mortimer Caplin clarified the implications associated with policy 
termination: “[T]he question may arise whether a taxpayer’s voluntary disclosure of his willful 
violations will afford immunity against criminal prosecution. I want to reaffirm our existing policy in 
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have been captured in various renditions of the Internal Revenue 
Manual,6 an assortment of administrative pronouncements,7 and 
numerous commissioner and Treasury Department statements.8 
However, at the turn of the century, the salience of the voluntary 
disclosure program changed dramatically. Through a series of 
discoveries, the Treasury Department learned that thousands upon 
thousands of taxpayers were failing to report their offshore income, 
and for the first time, the agency developed viable strategies to 
uncover the identity of culpable taxpayers.9 One major problem, 
however, was that the IRS lacked the resources to audit, let alone 
criminally prosecute, all of those who were guilty of tax 
noncompliance. The agency, therefore, commenced and broadly 
publicized a permutation of its voluntary disclosure program, known 
as the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP), and its 
participation qualifications.10 
 
this regard. Even true voluntary disclosure of a willful violation will not of itself guarantee prosecution 
immunity.” Harry Graham Balter, Caplin Restates Voluntary Disclosure Policy As Rumors of IRS 
Change Circulate, 16 J. TAX’N 104, 104 (1962) (quoting I.R.S. News Release IR-61-432 (Dec. 13, 
1961)). 
 6. See, e.g., IRM 9.5.11 (Sept. 17, 2020). 
 7. See, e.g., Allen D. Madison, An Analysis of the IRS’s Voluntary Disclosure Policy, 54 TAX LAW. 
729, 731 n.27 (2001) (“We want to encourage people to come forward voluntarily and get right with the 
government.” (quoting I.R.S. News Release IR-92-94 (Sept. 30, 1922))). For a set of earlier Treasury 
announcements, see generally Gerald L. Wallace, Penalties and Prosecutions for Evasion of the Federal 
Income Tax, 1 TAX L. REV. 329, 341–43 (1946). 
 8. For example, in 1945, Fred L. Vinson, the Secretary of the Treasury, stated, “The Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue does not recommend criminal prosecution in the case of any taxpayer who makes a 
voluntary disclosure of omission or other misstatement in his tax return or of failure to make a tax 
return.” Burns & Rachlin, supra note 2. Later, in 1947, J.P. Wenchel, then-Chief Counsel of the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue (the predecessor to the IRS), stated thus: 
The Department has broad discretionary power long recognized by Congress to 
determine the policy and procedure for the effective enforcement of the internal 
revenue laws. The Department, acting under that power, does not recommend 
prosecution of the evader who repents in time. There is nothing new in this position. 
For years the position of the Department has been that where the taxpayer makes a 
voluntary disclosure of the intentional evasion before investigation has been initiated, 
criminal prosecution will not be recommended. 
Id. 
 9. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-318, OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: IRS 
HAS COLLECTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, BUT MAY BE MISSING CONTINUED EVASION (2013) 
(describing the breadth of the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program and providing a description of 
those taxpayers who participated in it). 
 10. The first of such programs was the Offshore Credit Card Program. I.R.S. News Release 
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The OVDP proved to be resoundingly successful. It brought in 
billions of dollars in otherwise lost tax revenue and eliminated the 
need to audit and prosecute tens of thousands of taxpayers.11 In 
addition, it caused the IRS to rethink the entirety of its voluntary 
disclosure program and its key attributes. Indeed, in a recent 
announcement, the agency released yet another iteration of its 
voluntary disclosure program, spelling out its salient features and the 
virtues associated with participation.12 
This Article argues that the IRS—an administrative branch of 
government—should not have unimpeded authority to model the 
voluntary disclosure program’s salient features and contends instead 
that codification is in order.13 Notwithstanding the fact that a 
legislative overlay would provide less flexibility to the IRS and 
participating taxpayers to orchestrate their affairs, its institution 
would bring continuity, uniformity, and consistency to the program. 
To make the case for codification, this Article is divided into 
several Parts. First, Part I summarizes the history of the voluntary 
disclosure program. Next, Part II details the present program and 
critiques its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, Part III contends that 
Congress should enact a permanent voluntary disclosure program and 
explains why the advantages of doing so far outweigh the 
disadvantages.  
 
IR-2003-95 (July 30, 2003). During the course of the next several years, the IRS announced the details 
of multiple voluntary offshore disclosure programs that it instituted in 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2014. Am. 
Bar Ass’n Section of Tax’n, Commentary, Comments on the 2014 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure 
Program and the Streamlined Procedures, 72 TAX LAW. 65, 74–75 (2018). 
 11. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-52 (Mar. 13, 2018) (“Since the OVDP’s initial launch in 2009, 
more than 56,000 taxpayers have used one of the programs to comply voluntarily. All told, those 
taxpayers paid a total of $11.1 billion in back taxes, interest and penalties.”).  
 12. I.R.S. Mem. LB&I-09-1118-014 (Nov. 20, 2018) [hereinafter I.R.S. Mem.]. 
 13. Decades ago, then-Senator Max Baucus sought to codify the voluntary disclosure program. 
Richard E. Harris, Finance Bill Would Codify IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program and Stiffen Penalties 
for Tax Cheats, 31 TAX NOTES 650, 650 (1986); Richard E. Harris, Baucus Continues to Back Tax 
Amnesty; Skeptics Question Promises of IRS Expansion, 30 TAX NOTES 1207, 1207 (1986); 132 CONG. 
REC. 2856–64 (1986) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus). Baucus’s legislative efforts, however, were 
never realized. 
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM 
In the criminal world, prosecutors know that their cases become 
precipitously weaker when alleged perpetrators, of their own volition, 
come forward, express contrition, and demonstrate a willingness to 
bear the consequences of their prior actions.14 The exact same 
phenomenon has been true for crimes that relate to tax compliance: 
those taxpayers who have crossed the line but subsequently seek to 
make amends are difficult to prosecute.15 The voluntary disclosure 
program, a deeply woven part of the nation’s fabric for more than a 
century, tacitly recognizes this reality by allowing taxpayers who 
participate in it, in most instances, to avoid criminal exposure.16 
But in the criminal world, there is another commonplace reality; 
namely, absent extenuating circumstances, few perpetrators are 
willing to come forward and throw themselves upon the mercy of 
prosecutors and the courts. Instead, these often-hardened risk-takers 
are disposed to take their chances and assume that they will not get 
caught. Thus, the popularity of various voluntary disclosure 
programs—those that are tax-related and those that are not—rise and 
fall, heavily dependent on external factors that often correlate with 
the risk of detection.17 
 
 14. Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. 
REV. 295, 296 (2007) (“[A]pologies and expressions of remorse influence beliefs about the general 
character of the wrongdoer and the entrenchment of the wrongful behavior—wrongdoers who apologize 
are viewed as being of better character and as being less likely to engage in similar behavior in the 
future.”); Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological 
Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 1 UTAH L. REV. 167, 190–91 tbl.7 & fig.7 (2003) (finding that 
offenders’ apologies greatly increase the likelihood of forgiveness); Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without 
Remorse, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 131 (2006) (noting that, in sentencing, “[m]any state courts have 
found remorse to be an appropriate mitigating factor”). 
 15. An acknowledgment of this reality is reflected in the presence of the voluntary disclosure 
program. See Madison, supra note 7, at 732 (“The Voluntary Disclosure Policy may also serve as the tax 
enforcement entities’ implicit recognition that after a taxpayer comes forward and discloses her 
transgressions, it might be difficult to prove the willfulness necessary to obtain a conviction for a tax  
crime.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle Against 
Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 501 (2012) (“Under a voluntary disclosure program, 
eligible taxpayers report their delinquent taxes in return for reduced penalties . . . . It is thus a form of 
‘tax amnesty.’”). 
 17. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bennett, Killing One Bird with Two Stones: The Effect of Empagran and the 
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Consider three phases of the income tax and how they propelled 
the tax-related voluntary disclosure program into existence and then 
shaped its ever-evolving contours: (A) the introduction of the income 
tax, (B) the advent of the third-party tax information return matching 
program, and (C) the lifting of bank secrecy laws and the advent of 
the international third-party tax information return matching 
program. 
A. Introduction of the Income Tax 
At the inception of the income tax in 1913, tax noncompliance was 
likely flagrant.18 The law was new, and those who were 
noncompliant could always proffer the excuse that they did not know 
any better (i.e., they lacked the mens rea to be guilty of a crime). And 
for several years, the plea of ignorance under the law probably 
resonated with judges and juries, saving many taxpayers from 
incarceration for tax noncompliance.19 In addition, though the 
historical record is sketchy, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (the 
predecessor to the IRS), at its nascent stage of existence, likely 
lacked sufficient labor power to conduct wide-scale and thorough 
 
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 on Detecting and Deterring 
International Cartels, 93 GEO. L.J. 1421, 1446–47 (2005) (“The success of the amnesty program 
[pertaining to antitrust actions] depends, in large part, on whether the conspirators fear detection.”). 
 18. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS 
HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A CHRONOLOGY 1646–1992, at 87 (1993) [hereinafter CHRONOLOGY] (“By 
the end of fiscal year 1913 the administrative force in Washington D.C. numbered 277 
employees . . . .”); cf. id. at 99 (“The personnel of the Washington office of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue increased from 585 to 4,088 in this period [1917–1919].”). 
 19. See Rau v. United States, 260 F. 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1919) (“If the defendant, in good faith, made 
the payment of the tax and penalty for the purpose of compromising the impending action, he is entitled 
to full protection and the benefits derived therefrom. If the money was accepted with the promise of 
immunity from further punishment in a criminal proceeding, it would be a complete defense to this 
indictment.” (citing Willingham v. United States, 208 F. 137 (5th Cir. 1913))). Consider another judge’s 
pronouncement relating to the predecessor to the modern income tax laws: 
The lax state of morals in this and other American communities, which excuses, if not 
encourages, persons to avoid the payment of taxes justly due the national, state and 
municipal governments, by the use of means which would be considered dishonest 
between man and man, may have had much to do with the commission of this crime 
by you. For these reasons, and particularly on account of the recommendation of the 
jury, I shall make your punishment lighter than I otherwise would. 
United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1175, 1185–86 (D. Or. 1870). 
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audits; and as a result, those audits it did undertake were probably 
fairly rudimentary in nature.20 
Nevertheless, the threat of criminal tax exposure always loomed. A 
spurned spouse, a fired bookkeeper, or a disgruntled employee could 
have incriminating information (e.g., records of stashed-away cash or 
a second set of books) that might make any derelict taxpayer shudder. 
Some of those very same taxpayers, not knowing at what point 
betrayal would arise, likely sought to take preemptive measures to 
insulate themselves from criminal exposure. Of their own volition, 
they, or their tax professionals, undoubtedly reached out to the IRS to 
demonstrate remorse before the agency contacted them, attempting to 
negate the grim repercussions associated with their prior criminal 
intent. 
With World War I raging, in lieu of traditional customs, duties, 
and tariffs, the nation grew increasingly dependent on the income 
tax.21 As this reliance became more pronounced, the IRS blossomed 
in size and sophistication. During the half-decade since the income 
tax’s introduction (from 1913 to 1918), the IRS’s staff undoubtedly 
became seasoned veterans, skilled at ferreting out those taxpayers 
who may have fallen far short of the mark and fraudulently failed to 
report income, took nonexistent deductions, or grossly exaggerated 
the size of their deductions.22 As might be expected, the number of 
criminal tax cases grew as the year 1920 approached, compared to 
the number of cases when the income tax was first introduced.23 
 
 20. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 18, at 99 (“[In 1919, the] Income Tax Unit established the Field Audit 
Division responsible for the field forces engaged in investigation of income and profits tax cases. Prior 
to this, the field forces were under the direction of the Chief of Revenue Agents, who reported directly 
to the Commissioner.”). 
 21. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33665, U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
REVENUES: 1790 TO THE PRESENT 6 (2006). 
 22. As reflected in IRS Historical Fact Book: A Chronology, 1646–1992, the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue quickly became increasingly large and grew in sophistication over the years following the 
introduction of the income tax. See CHRONOLOGY, supra note 18. 
 23. There are no published federal criminal tax cases in 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, or 1918. 
However, beginning in 1919, the United States prosecuted several criminal income tax cases. E.g., 
Sandberg v. United States, 257 F. 643 (9th Cir. 1919); United States v. Benowitz, 262 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 
1919); Rau, 260 F. at 132. 
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These combined forces—anxious taxpayers coupled with an 
enforcement agency strengthening its compliance reach—likely 
silently drove the IRS to introduce its first voluntary disclosure 
program in 1919.24 Derelict taxpayers, under pressure from their 
personal circumstances (e.g., failed marriages, troubled work 
relationships, or aborted business arrangements) or from the 
knowledge that the IRS was increasingly becoming a formidable 
enforcement body, recognized that a day of reckoning might soon be 
upon them. In addition, from a public policy perspective, the IRS 
likely sought to welcome back those taxpayers who expressed a 
willingness to return to the fold of being tax compliant. 
Little is known about the specifics of the first voluntary disclosure 
program.25 Nevertheless, there was a central feature of the newly 
instituted voluntary disclosure program that has withstood the test of 
time: to qualify, a participating taxpayer had to initiate a voluntary 
disclosure action before the IRS launched an investigation.26 More 
specifically, if the IRS had already commenced an investigation and 
those being investigated then sought refuge in the voluntary 
disclosure program, their entreaties would be ignored and would 
potentially place the taxpayers at graver risk of criminal exposure.27 
 
 24. The statutory basis for the voluntary disclosure program was Code section 3761 (1939), the 
predecessor of Code section 7122. 
 25. Bonnie G. Ross, Federal Tax Amnesty: Reflecting on the States’ Experiences, 40 TAX LAW. 145, 
146–47 (1986) (“In 1919, the Bureau of Internal Revenue adopted a policy of accepting offers in 
compromise of criminal liability in cases of voluntary disclosure. Approximately three weeks after its 
institution, however, the policy was amended to provide that offers in compromise of criminal liability 
would be considered, rather than automatically accepted, in voluntary disclosure cases.”).  
 26. Bartholomew L. McLeay, Note, Disincentives to Voluntary Disclosure: United States v. Hebel 
and Deleet Merchandizing Corp. v. Commissioner, 3 VA. TAX REV. 401, 403 (1984) (citing INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., REPORT ON ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN TAX COMPLIANCE, HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE POLICY (1968)). 
 27. See id. at 416 n.105. 
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B. Advent of Third-Party Tax Information Return Matching 
Program 
One of history’s greatest tools to compel tax compliance has been 
the introduction of third-party tax information reporting.28 Such 
reporting has yielded extraordinary outcomes: when third-party tax 
information reporting is available (e.g., employers report wage 
income via a Form W-2 (Wage and Tax Statement) and banks report 
interest income via a Form 1099-INT (Interest Income)), tax 
compliance is stellar, in the 99% range. By way of contrast, when no 
third-party tax information reporting is available (e.g., farm and 
small-business income), tax compliance is abominable, hovering 
around 50% and sometimes even much lower.29 
This compliance trend, related to third-party tax information 
reporting, annually repeats itself and is a worldwide tax 
phenomenon.30 Building upon such successes, Congress therefore 
constantly seeks to expand third-party tax information reporting. For 
example, under current law, to the extent technologically possible, 
financial transactions ranging from house closings to stock sales 
engender some form of third-party tax information reporting 
obligation.31 
Notwithstanding the virtues associated with third-party tax 
information reporting, it has not always been part and parcel of the 
 
 28. Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371, 371–72 (2007). 
 29. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28 (Feb. 14, 2006) (finding that, for nonfarm individual 
proprietor income for which there is no third-party reporting, the misreporting rate was 57%, whereas 
for wages, salaries, and tips for which there is third-party reporting, the misreporting rate was 1%); see 
also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 07-391T, TAX COMPLIANCE: MULTIPLE APPROACHES 
ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE TAX GAP: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. 
SENATE (2007) (statement of Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues Strategic Issues Team) 
(“Withholding and information reporting are particularly powerful tools to reduce the tax gap.”); JON 
BAKIJA & JOEL SLEMROD, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 256 
(5th ed. 2017) (describing a study showing a 99.1% compliance rate for wages and salaries, a 43% 
compliance rate for nonfarm sole proprietors, and a 28% compliance rate for farm income). 
 30. See, e.g., Deepshikha Sikarwar, CBEC to Use Third-Party Information to Nab Tax Evaders, THE 
ECON. TIMES: WEALTH, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/personal-finance-news/cbec-to-
use-third-party-information-to-nab-tax-evaders/articleshow/40383561.cms [https://perma.cc/6DBT-
9WPU] (Aug. 19, 2014, 3:00 AM IST) (describing how India plans to expand its third-party tax 
reporting beyond the income tax to its value-added tax). 
 31. See I.R.C. § 6045 (delineating a whole series of Code sections that require third-party reporting). 
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Internal Revenue Code (Code). The reason for its earlier absence was 
logistical in nature. At the embryonic stages of the income tax, the 
IRS did not have the technological ability to compare what taxpayers 
reported on their tax returns with projections of what taxpayers 
should have reported on their tax returns. 
But over time, the IRS grew in size and sophistication. In addition, 
due to the advent of World War II, tremendous financial demands 
arose. Accordingly, in 1943, Congress launched a novel withholding 
program targeting wage income.32 With this program’s introduction, 
for the first time, the IRS possessed a tool that used third-party 
employers to determine if taxpayers were being forthright in their 
reporting practices—at least insofar as wage income was 
concerned—and cast a spotlight upon all of those taxpayers who 
perhaps previously failed to file their income tax returns. 
With the advent of third-party tax information return matching and 
withholding, the IRS faced the prospect that an onslaught of 
delinquent taxpayers would emerge from the woodwork. At the time, 
to audit and possibly criminally charge all of these taxpayers with 
failure to file and report income would have been resource-intensive. 
Furthermore, this risked both highlighting taxpayer truancy and 
undermining credibility in the system. That being the case, the 
agency made a series of public declarations regarding the availability 
of the voluntary disclosure program and strongly recommended that 
delinquent taxpayers avail themselves of this program or face 
possible dire consequences, including the imposition of steep 
penalties and criminal indictment.33 
Relative to the original iteration of the voluntary disclosure 
program commenced in 1919, a bit more is known about the contours 
of the revised voluntary disclosure program. To qualify for 
participation, among other requirements, a participating taxpayer had 
 
 32. Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-68, § 6, 57 Stat. 126, 145–49. 
 33. See Lyon, supra note 4, at 495 (“[D]uring the period from about 1943 to 1947, . . . the Treasury 
took these two steps: (a) It put great publicity emphasis on special tax fraud drives; and (b) Various 
pronouncements were made to encourage taxpayers to take advantage of the voluntary disclosure 
policy.”). 
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to initiate action before being investigated;34 and starting in 1974, 
another requirement was added: the taxpayer’s motives had to be 
pure.35 Insofar as the second qualification was concerned, moral 
impurities driving the taxpayer’s actions were to be taken into 
account; that is, an extenuating fact suggesting that the tax scofflaw 
sought to preempt the inevitable (e.g., due to a pending divorce, a 
spurned ex-spouse made overtures that she was determined to make a 
revenge disclosure) could potentially negate program qualification.36 
From the middle to the end of the twentieth century, in an 
endeavor to boost taxpayer compliance, Congress added numerous 
third-party tax information reporting requirements.37 As the nation’s 
legislative branch instituted these reforms, the IRS made a series of 
adjustments to its voluntary disclosure program—sometimes 
expanding its availability and other times suspending its use.38 It was 
a program with which Congress took a completely hands-off 
approach, granting carte blanche to the IRS as to how the agency 
wanted to administer it to expand tax compliance.39 
 
 34. See United States v. Lustig, 163 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1947) (“We think it clear from the findings 
and the evidence . . . that the investigation began at the latest on March 24, 1945, when the Treasury 
Department referred the report of the Federal Reserve Bank to the Special Agent in charge of the 
Treasury Intelligence Unit . . . .”). 
 35. See Richard J. Trattner & Mark D. Pastor, IRS Disclosure Policy: The Internal Revenue Service 
Again Abandons Voluntary Disclosure, L.A. LAW., May 1978, at 30, 33 (citing Memorandum from the 
Assistant Reg’l Couns., Crim. Tax, to the Assistant Reg’l Couns., Branch Offs., W. Region (Apr. 25, 
1974)). 
 36. Id. (“Where the disclosure is ‘triggered’ by an event which would ultimately lead to the 
Service’s being apprised of the taxpayer’s fraud by third party sources, the taxpayer’s disclosure is 
neither truly voluntary nor motivated by altruistic desires. [The Service will henceforth recommend 
prosecution] . . . in those cases where an apparent voluntary disclosure has been ‘triggered’ by an event 
which ‘forced’ the taxpayer to disclose his tax situation to the Service. . . . As [an] example of [a] 
‘triggered’ disclosure . . . a taxpayer’s disgruntled wife announces that she is going to ‘pull the plug’ on 
him, and he beats her to it by making a disclosure to the Service. (Such a disclosure is not voluntary.).” 
(alternations in original)). 
 37. Such third-party tax information now even extends internationally. See infra notes 62–66. 
 38. See generally Trattner & Pastor, supra note 35 (describing the long and tortured history of the 
nation’s voluntary disclosure policy). 
 39. Id. at 31. 
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C. Lifting of Bank Secrecy Laws and the Advent of International 
Third-Party Tax Information Return Matching Program 
For decades, many taxpayers sought to make offshore investments. 
The reason was not because they thought that they could command 
higher profits from offshore investments than from domestic 
investments; instead, they believed that they could shield from 
taxation the income they earned related to such investments.40 
As a practical matter, those taxpayers making these investments 
likely suspected that the IRS could not detect the income that they 
generated.41 And for the most part, those taxpayers were right: many 
countries’ bank secrecy laws safeguarded taxpayers’ identities and 
investments from discovery.42 Furthermore, the IRS lacked any 
meaningful mechanism to gain direct, or even indirect, access to 
identify those taxpayers and their shrouded accounts.43 
When it came to overseas investments, the IRS’s agenda was not 
focused upon tax noncompliance. Instead, the agency concentrated 
primarily on crimes related to money laundering and the like, and 
 
 40. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFS., 109TH CONG., TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY 
1 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter TAX HAVEN ABUSES] (offering six case studies to illustrate various 
techniques that taxpayers use to hide assets, shift income, and utilize offshore entities in endeavors to 
circumvent their U.S. tax obligations). 
 41. See I.R.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TDP-2003-30-160, THE OFFSHORE CREDIT CARD PROJECT SHOWS 
PROMISE, BUT IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT COMPLIANCE OBJECTIVES ARE 
ACHIEVED 1 (2003) (“[T]he Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Commissioner described abusive schemes 
using offshore bank accounts as causing the largest revenue loss to the Department of the Treasury, 
being the hardest to detect, and undermining the fairness of the tax system. The IRS Commissioner has 
said that ‘diversion of income to offshore tax havens with strict bank secrecy laws represent[s] a 
significant area of noncompliance with tax laws.’”); see also Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore 
Banks and Companies: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on 
Governmental Affs., 98th Cong. 16 (1983) (statement of Sen. William Roth) (expressing the difficulty 
the IRS had in detecting offshore taxpayer noncompliance). 
 42. See TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 40, at 9 (“Corporate and financial secrecy laws and 
practices in offshore tax havens make it easy to conceal and obscure the economic realities underlying a 
great number of financial transactions with unfair results unintended under U.S. tax and securities 
laws.”). 
 43. Taxpayers were often abetted by international banks and foreign governments that competed in 
the global arena for U.S. investors. See generally Diane Ring, Who Is Making International Tax 
Policy?: International Organizations As Power Players in a High Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 649 (2009). 
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even those cases were difficult to prove.44 Yes, taxpayers who made 
overseas investments were supposed to file Foreign Bank Account 
Reports (FBARs) and declare the existence of such investments.45 
Many taxpayers nevertheless failed to do so, and their noncompliance 
was often met with impunity.46 
Locked in obscurity, taxpayers flocked to making foreign 
investments.47 Coaxed and coddled by overseas investment advisers 
and an array of others,48 and using a variety of maneuvers,49 U.S. 
taxpayers learned how to avoid even minimal chances of IRS 
detection. Indeed, it was protocol in the industry for overseas 
investment institutions not to issue monthly or annual investment 
statements to their U.S. investors.50 
 
 44. See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH § 361(B) OF THE 
UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT 
AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT) 9 (2002) [hereinafter TREASURY 
REPORT] (noting that from 1993 to 2002, the U.S. government considered imposing monetary penalties 
in only twelve cases, resulting in only two taxpayers ultimately paying penalties; four being issued 
“letters of warning”; and for a variety of reasons, the remaining six not having their cases pursued). 
 45. This law, known at the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5314, was enacted as part of the Currency 
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970). 
 46. See, e.g., Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, and Why It 
Matters, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (“Despite these potential sanctions, FBAR compliance 
has remained relatively low for years.”); TREASURY REPORT, supra note 44, at 6 (“[T]he IRS estimates 
that there may be as many as 1 million U.S. taxpayers who have signature authority or control over a 
foreign bank account and may be required to file FBARs. Thus, the approximate rate of compliance with 
the FBAR filing requirements based on this information could be less than 20 percent.”). 
 47. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 44, at 11 (“Using IRS summonses to obtain information from 
these offshore jurisdictions can be prohibitively difficult and time consuming.”). 
 48. Scott D. Michel, Strategies for Current Filings of Noncompliant Taxpayers As FBAR Deadline 
Approaches, 92 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 207, 209 (2014) (“Enforcement against so-called ‘enablers’ 
continues apace as well—these are the bankers, lawyers, fiduciaries, and investment advisors alleged to 
have assisted U.S. taxpayers in hiding money and other assets overseas. One prominent Swiss banker 
was arrested on holiday in Italy, and other bankers and advisors believed to have engaged in willful 
criminal conduct have been detained at the U.S. border. Tax practitioners in the U.S. who have assisted 
clients in hiding foreign accounts are also under scrutiny.”). 
 49. See generally TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 40 (illustrating various techniques that taxpayers 
employ to circumvent their tax obligations). 
 50. See, e.g., David Leigh et al., HSBC Files Show How Swiss Bank Helped Clients Dodge Taxes 
and Hide Millions, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2015, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/08/hsbc-files-expose-swiss-bank-clients-dodge-taxes-
hide-millions [https://perma.cc/5B2A-KGYP] (“HSBC’s Swiss banking arm helped wealthy customers 
dodge taxes and conceal millions of dollars of assets, doling out bundles of untraceable cash and 
advising clients on how to circumvent domestic tax authorities, according to a huge cache of leaked 
secret bank account files.”); Gary S. Wolfe, Why Tax Evasion Is a Bad Idea: UBS and Wegelin Bank, 
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But with increased technology and the globalization of the world’s 
economy, the era of bank secrecy waned.51 With the tap of a finger, 
bank personnel could gain electronic access to thousands of 
accounts.52 Congress then augmented the Code’s whistleblower 
awards, affording bank officials the means and ample financial 
incentives to divulge incriminating information to welcoming 
government officials.53 There was little that banks and financial 
institutions could do to stop this from happening; as a result, 
information floodgates poured open.54 For example, in 2007, Bradley 
Birkenfeld, a UBS employee, turned over the names of 54,000 
 
PRAC. TAX LAW., Spring 2013, at 39, 43. According to international tax lawyer Gary Wolfe, one Swiss 
bank, Wegelin, took the following steps to conceal its account holders’ identities: 
• Opening and servicing undeclared accounts for U.S. taxpayer-clients in the 
names of sham corporations and foundations formed under the laws of 
Liechtenstein, Panama, and Hong Kong (and other jurisdictions) to conceal 
clients’ identities from the IRS; 
• [Accepting] documents falsely declaring that the sham entities were the 
beneficial owners of certain accounts, when in fact the accounts were 
beneficially owned by U.S. taxpayers; 
• [Allowing U.S. taxpayers to maintain] Wegelin accounts (undeclared), using 
code names and numbers to minimize references to the actual names of the U.S. 
taxpayers on Swiss bank documents; 
• [Ensuring] that account statements and other mail were not mailed to U.S. 
clients in the U.S.; they were instead sent to U.S. taxpayer clients’ personal 
email accounts, to reduce risk of detection by law enforcement; 
• [Issuing] checks drawn on, and executing wire transfers to, its U.S. 
correspondent bank accounts for the benefit of U.S. taxpayers with undeclared 
accounts at Wegelin (and at least two other Swiss banks); 
• [Separating] the transfers into batches of checks or multiple wire transfers in 
amounts that were less than $10,000 to reduce the risk that the IRS would detect 
the undeclared accounts; [and] 
• [Using] its correspondent bank accounts at UBS to help U.S. taxpayers with 
undeclared accounts repatriate money that they had hidden in Wegelin. 
Wolfe, supra, at 43–44. 
 51. See generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018) 
(describing a whole series of tax-related data leaks that often resulted in criminal prosecutions and 
politicians seeking legislative changes to enhance tax compliance). 
 52. Id. at 542 (“In the age of centralized and computerized data storage, it has become easier for 
disgruntled employees, hackers, and other data thieves to obtain tax-related data from banks, law firms, 
and other sources and to leak it.”). 
 53. I.R.C. § 7623. 
 54. See Lynnley Browning, Swiss Banker Blows Whistle on Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/business/19whistle.html [https://perma.cc/2YUS-WVZM] 
(detailing the case of a former Swiss banker who delivered tax-related information regarding “more than 
100 trusts, dozens of companies and hedge funds and more than 1,300 individuals, from 1997 through 
2002” to the IRS, a Senate subcommittee conducting tax investigations, and the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Office). 
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overseas investors, earning a whopping $104 million whistleblower 
award for his efforts.55 
Technology also caused other avenues of tax circumvention to 
come to a brisk end. For example, in the Information Age, taxpayers 
quickly learned that their erstwhile means of using credit cards 
funded with offshore funds were problematic.56 With electronic 
tracing and the IRS’s power to subpoena credit card company 
records, the fate of this noncompliance route came to a complete and 
sudden conclusion.57 
The avalanche of information that the IRS was receiving and 
processing painted an ugly picture of rampant tax noncompliance. 
Thousands upon thousands of taxpayers were engaging in overseas 
investing and failing to report their earned income, costing the nation 
billions of dollars in lost tax revenue.58 Previously, academics, 
politicians, and others pontificated that the tax-reporting situation 
was bad, but even they underestimated just how bleak the situation 
truly was.59 
The gravity of the problem stirred rare bipartisan congressional 
responses. Congress’s members took up arms and decided to launch a 
two-pronged attack. First, they sought to lift the veil of secrecy that 
cloaked many offshore accounts; therefore, along with the rest of the 
world leaders, they pressured foreign governments to repeal their 
 
 55. See generally BRADLEY C. BIRKENFELD, LUCIFER’S BANKER UNCENSORED (2016) (detailing 
Birkenfeld’s personal account of the UBS scandal and how he secured the whistleblower award). 
 56. See I.R.S. TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 41, at 2 (“The IRS approach is multifaceted and includes 
coordinating Compliance activities with media coverage and the Criminal Investigation function to 
heighten taxpayer awareness. In summary, the IRS obtains cardholder and merchant credit card records 
to identify the taxpayer, builds cases for assignment to the Compliance field function, generates media 
coverage, and refers promoters for criminal investigation.”). 
 57. See generally Paul Jensen & Pam Spikes, Offshore Credit Card Records: Invasion by the IRS, 29 
INT’L TAX J. 59, 59 (2003) (describing how the IRS curtailed illicit offshore credit card use). 
 58. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFS., 110TH CONG., TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (Comm. 
Print 2008) (“Each year, the United States loses an estimated $100 billion in tax revenues due to 
offshore tax abuses.”). 
 59. See Joseph Guttentag & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in BRIDGING 
THE TAX GAP: ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 99, 101 (Max B. Sawicky 
ed., 2005) (estimating that individuals’ offshore tax evasion resulted in $40–$70 billion in annual lost 
U.S. tax revenues). 
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bank secrecy laws or risk economic reprisals.60 With much 
reluctance, these governments (in particular, the legislature in 
Switzerland) agreed to pull back the veil of their bank secrecy laws, 
opening these accounts and their owners to scrutiny.61 Second, 
Congress instituted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA).62 Under the Act, foreign financial institutions must either 
(i) disclose the identities of U.S. investors to the IRS, or (ii) endure a 
punishing withholding tax on their U.S. investments.63 Given these 
choices, the vast majority of foreign financial institutions chose what 
they perceived to be the lesser evil, fulfilling the disclosure-reporting 
requirements rather than enduring the harsh withholding tax.64 As 
 
 60. See Kevin McCoy, U.S. Wants Names of 52,000 Customers of Swiss Bank UBS, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/2009-02-18-ubs-settles-sec-
charges_N.htm [https://perma.cc/KM7V-28PA] (noting that the U.S. Department of Justice demanded 
that the UBS bank give up the names of 52,000 of its customers). 
 61. See Michael Shields, Era of Bank Secrecy Ends As Swiss Start Sharing Account Data, REUTERS, 
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-secrecy-idUSKCN1MF13O 
[https://perma.cc/U5H3-KB6C] (“The era of mystery-cloaked numbered Swiss bank accounts has 
officially come to a close as Switzerland, the world’s biggest center for managing offshore wealth, 
began automatically sharing client data with tax authorities in dozens of other countries.”); see also Itai 
Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 313 (2012) (“Most 
governments of major developed countries agree that access to information from other countries is vital 
to the full and fair enforcement of their tax laws.”); G20, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM—LONDON SUMMIT, 2 APRIL 2009, at 5 (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GXH-XZU8] (noting that leaders of the 
G20 countries set a goal to end the era of banking secrecy and emphasized “a new cooperative tax 
environment”). 
 62. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501(a), 124 Stat. 71, 97–
106 (2010). 
 63. See Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going 
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2967 (2011) (“In an effort to 
crack down on offshore tax evasion, the United States is implementing a new set of information 
reporting and withholding requirements on foreign banks and other foreign entities. These provisions, 
known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) . . . require thirty percent withholding of 
the entity’s U.S.-source income, unless they disclose specific information regarding their customers’ 
identities and account balances.”). 
 64. See Robert W. Wood, 10 Facts About FATCA, America’s Manifest Destiny Law Changing 
Banking Worldwide, FORBES (Aug. 19. 2014, 2:27 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/08/19/ten-facts-about-fatca-americas-manifest-destiny-
law-changing-banking-worldwide/#55d9a9951305 [https://perma.cc/7SQS-TECD] (“More than 80 
nations—including virtually every one that matters—have agreed to the law. So far, over 77,000 
financial institutions have signed on too. Countries must throw their agreement behind the law or face 
dire repercussions.”). See generally Reuters Staff, U.S. Says 77,000 Banks, Firms Sign Up to Fight Tax 
Evasion, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-fatca/u-s-says-77000-banks-firms-sign-
up-to-fight-tax-evasion-idUSKBN0ED1U620140602 [https://perma.cc/Y4Q9-LMLX] (June 2, 2014, 
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part of FATCA, Congress also expanded tax information reporting 
requirements beyond bank accounts; by mandating the use of a Form 
8938 (Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets), Congress 
requires taxpayers to disclose their foreign income-generating 
financial assets (e.g., foreign rental property held in an entity).65 The 
failure to make such disclosures triggers the application of stiff 
penalties, and violations can be deemed to be criminal in nature.66 
As was previously the case when Congress introduced third-party 
tax information returns,67 noncompliant taxpayers recognized that 
they had placed themselves in a precarious situation. If they did 
nothing, they risked almost certain discovery and possibly time spent 
locked up in a penitentiary; yet if they turned themselves in, they 
risked the same criminal exposure and consequences. However, in 
recognition of the fact that the IRS could not possibly audit and 
prosecute all of the delinquent taxpayers and in an endeavor to make 
the latter option (turning themselves in) more attractive, the Treasury 
Department commenced the OVDP, a subset of the voluntary 
disclosure program.68 
Although the OVDP’s premise was simple—if taxpayers came 
forward before being investigated, they could quash potential 
criminal tax exposure—details regarding program participation 
underwent several permutations.69 First introduced by the IRS in 
2003,70 the OVDP pertained specifically to taxpayers who used credit 
cards linked to unreported offshore bank accounts.71 Forthcoming 
taxpayers had reduced penalty exposure and, furthermore, 
safeguarded themselves from criminal exposure.72 During the next 
 
1:47 PM). 
 65. I.R.C. § 6038D. 
 66. § 6038D(d). 
 67. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 68. See Mary Lou Gervie, Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, TAX ADVISOR (Apr. 1, 2011), 
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2011/apr/april-tpp-2011-02.html [https://perma.cc/UM4M-
UTZG] (“The IRS initiated the first offshore voluntary compliance program in 2003.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. For an excellent overview of the voluntary disclosure program, see Lederman, supra note 16. 
 71. Lederman, supra note 16, at 504–08. 
 72. Id. at 506. 
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several years, beyond the 2003 initiative, the IRS commenced four 
new OVDPs, launched in 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2014. Details of 
each of these program participation requirements are enumerated 
below, and their salient features are encapsulated in the Appendix.73 
2009 Program:74 
• Payment of all back taxes, interest, and an 
accuracy-related penalty; 
• Accurate filing of the prior six years of income tax 
returns and FBARs (2003–2008); 
• Standard offshore penalty rate: in lieu of the FBAR 
and other penalties, payment of a 20% penalty on 
the taxpayer’s highest offshore account balance. 
2011 Program:75 
• Payment of all back taxes, interest, and an 
accuracy-related penalty; 
• Accurate filing of the prior eight years of income 
tax returns and FBARs (2003–2010); 
• Standard offshore penalty rate: in lieu of the FBAR 
and other penalties, payment of a 25% penalty on 
the taxpayer’s highest offshore account balance. 
 
 73. See infra Appendix. 
 74. See Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff, Deputy IRS Comm’r for Servs. & Enf’t, to Comm’r, 
Large & Mid-Size Bus. Div., and Comm’r, Small Bus./Self-Employed Div. (Mar. 23, 2009), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/memorandum_authorizing_penalty_framework.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PTE-69MF]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 9 (May 6, 
2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8K3-F3ZA] (“The twenty percent 
penalty applies to entities. The twenty percent penalty applies to all assets (or at least the taxpayer’s 
share) held by foreign entities (e.g., trusts and corporations) for which the taxpayer was required to file 
information returns, as well as all foreign assets (e.g., financial accounts, tangible assets such as real 
estate or art, and intangible assets such as patents or stock or other interests in a U.S. business) held or 
controlled by the taxpayer.”). 
 75. I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-14 (Feb. 8, 2011). See generally Kevin E. Packman, IRS Renews 
Its Focus on Unreported Foreign Accounts and Assets: The 2011 Disclosure Program, 114 J. TAX’N 
197 (2011). 
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2012 Program:76 
• Payment of all back taxes, interest, and an 
accuracy-related penalty; 
• Accurate filing of the prior eight years of income 
tax returns and FBARs (2004–2011); 
• The introduction of a separate streamlined program 
(which was not part of the OVDP) that allowed 
qualifying taxpayers (i.e., U.S. taxpayers living 
abroad who owed $1,500 or less in tax for any of 
the covered years) to resolve their tax issues with no 
penalties;77 
• Standard offshore penalty rate: in lieu of the FBAR 
and other penalties, payment of a 27.5% penalty on 
the taxpayer’s highest offshore account balance. 
2014 Program:78 
• Payment of all back taxes, interest, and an 
accuracy-related penalty; 
• Accurate filing of the prior eight years of income 
tax returns and FBARs (2006–2013); 
• Expansion of the streamlined program by including 
non-willful taxpayers residing in the United States 
and removing other eligibility requirements;79 
 
 76. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012). 
 77. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-65 (June 26, 2012); Streamlined Filing Compliance 
Procedures, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/streamlined-filing-
compliance-procedures [https://perma.cc/3ZFH-A2VT] (Feb. 17, 2021) (noting an effective date of 
September 1, 2012). 
 78. I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-73 (June 18, 2014). 
 79. Id. Under the revisions, taxpayers who were inadvertent in their noncompliance (e.g., their 
reporting failures were accidental or negligent rather than willful) were obligated to either (i) pay a 
minimal 5% penalty plus amend three years of prior income tax returns and submit six years of FBARs, 
or (ii) submit six years of FBARs in those instances when no tax was due. Id. 
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• Standard offshore penalty rate: in lieu of the FBAR 
and other penalties, payment of a 27.5% penalty on 
the taxpayer’s highest offshore account balance. 
For many years, the IRS reaped the benefits of the OVDP. As 
thousands of taxpayers became participants, the program yielded 
billions of tax dollars and brought many otherwise delinquent 
taxpayers back into the compliance fold.80 But over time, the number 
of willing participants dwindled, and thus the IRS decided in 2018 to 
terminate the OVDP.81 At the same time, the IRS decided to 
restructure the voluntary disclosure program. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM 
During the century that the voluntary disclosure program has been 
extant, it has never gained much national prominence. Although there 
may be many reasons for its low profile, one stands out: the 
voluntary disclosure program has an aura of amnesty surrounding it; 
as a result, many Treasury Department staff members, politicians, 
academics, and commentators harbor misgivings about instituting 
it.82 
 
 80. See I.R.S. News Release, IR-2018-52 (Mar. 13, 2018) (“Since the OVDP’s initial launch in 
2009, more than 56,000 taxpayers have used one of the programs to comply voluntarily. All told, those 
taxpayers paid a total of $11.1 billion in back taxes, interest and penalties. The planned end of the 
current OVDP also reflects advances in third-party reporting and increased awareness of U.S. taxpayers 
of their offshore tax and reporting obligations.”). 
 81. Closing the 2014 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program: Frequently Asked Questions and 
Answers, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/closing-the-2014-offshore-
voluntary-disclosure-program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc/W6GY-
MXQY] (Sept. 26, 2018) (“While the program has been successful in the past, there has been a 
significant decline in the number of taxpayers participating as well as an increase in awareness of 
offshore tax and reporting obligations.”); I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-52 (Mar. 13, 2018) (noting that 
while 18,000 disclosures were made in 2011, only 600 were made in 2017). 
 82. See, e.g., Efforts to Reduce Taxpayer Burdens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of 
the Internal Revenue Serv. of the Comm. on Fin., 98th Cong. 31 (1983) [hereinafter Efforts to Reduce 
Taxpayer Burdens] (statement of Roscoe L. Egger Jr., Comm’r, IRS) (“[H]onest taxpayers may perceive 
an amnesty as ‘special treatment’ for dishonest taxpayers, and therefore unfair, inequitable, and contrary 
to IRS policy of administering the tax laws uniformly.”). However, during the 1980s, there were heated 
debates about whether the federal government should introduce a tax amnesty program. See generally 
Richard E. Harris, Revenue Sans Taxes: Congress Shifts Attention to Federal Tax Amnesty, 30 TAX 
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By way of background, consider the nature of tax amnesty 
programs and their central features. Many such programs declare that 
delinquent taxpayers should come forward of their own accord and 
pay the tax they owe; as a quid pro quo for being compliant, 
participating taxpayers can, depending upon the program, pay a 
reduced interest charge, endure a smaller penalty or none at all, and 
avoid criminal prosecution.83 Other commonplace program features 
are that once the amnesty period lapses, exoneration will not be 
offered again, more burdensome penalties will be imposed, and 
added enforcement efforts will be undertaken.84 
State legislatures that have instituted tax amnesty programs have 
experienced mixed results.85 On the one hand, some have collected 
sizable amounts of tax revenue and have been able to add many new 
taxpayers to the compliance fold.86 On the other hand, the revenue 
collections have been lackluster in some instances, and it remains 
unclear whether participating states could have achieved the same 
objectives (namely, greater revenue flow and increased tax 
compliance) if they had simply instituted more rigorous enforcement 
mechanisms.87 Furthermore, the mere institution of tax amnesty 
 
NOTES 916 (1986); Carol Douglas, Is a Federal Amnesty the Answer to Our Deficit Problems?, 30 TAX 
NOTES 711 (1986). 
 83. See Elliott Uchitelle, The Effectiveness of Tax Amnesty Programs in Selected Countries, FED. 
RES. BANK N.Y. Q. REV., Autumn 1989, at 48, 48 (“[M]ost amnesty programs share a common 
feature—a grace period during which delinquent taxpayers can correct prior infractions of the tax law 
without incurring penalties normally associated with tax delinquency.”). 
 84. See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 667, 706 (2007) (“A tax amnesty also should signal, and be combined with, 
significantly heightened government efforts to enforce compliance with existing (or newly reformed) tax 
rules. In fact, to the extent that tax amnesties are successful it generally is difficult to determine whether 
that success is attributable to the amnesty, to the threat of enhanced enforcement efforts, or to the 
enhanced enforcement efforts themselves.”). 
 85. Gary Klott, State Amnesties: Results Mixed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1988 (§ D), at 2. 
 86. See, e.g., Boise, supra note 84, at 696–97 (“States collecting the largest amounts to date include 
New York with over $1.23 billion; New Jersey with $822 million, Illinois with $692 million, California 
with $197 million, and Massachusetts with $182 million.”). 
 87. Id. at 704–05 (“In the United States, Connecticut’s first tax amnesty, in 1990, generated $54 
million. A second amnesty five years later generated only $40.9 million. Of particular interest, however, 
was the fact that 219 participants in the second amnesty had also participated in the first amnesty. 
Together, the 219 participants accounted for 4.5% of the revenues collected in the 1990 amnesty and 
10.3% of the revenue collected in the subsequent amnesty. The inference is that having participated in 
one amnesty, taxpayers began to engage in strategic behavior in anticipation of the second amnesty.”). 
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programs sends an implicit message to noncompliant taxpayers that if 
they wait long enough, every few years they can be absolved of their 
sins.88 Both tax amnesty proponents and opponents point to 
conflicting data that support their differing positions.89 
Even if state tax amnesty programs are deemed successful, few 
believe that this “success” can be replicated at the federal level.90 The 
fear is that once an administration institutes an amnesty program to 
generate revenue, this practice will become reoccurring, ultimately 
undermining the system’s integrity as honest taxpayers think twice 
about being chumps and paying tax when actually due.91 In addition, 
it is unclear whether Congress would have the political stomach to 
institute heftier penalties upon those who remained noncompliant or 
to grant the IRS additional resources to conduct broader and more 
rigorous audits that the public would likely consider overly intrusive. 
Given the misgivings that surround federal tax amnesty programs, 
it is no surprise that the voluntary disclosure program has not gained 
much public recognition; after all, it shares some of the central 
characteristics of an amnesty program.92 Said in the vernacular of 
taxpayers, the voluntary disclosure program essentially declares that 
if one comes forward before being on the IRS’s radar screen, the 
agency will wipe the taxpayer’s slate clean—yes, one will have to 
pay back taxes, interest, and possible penalties, but these burdens 
pale in comparison to spending time locked away behind bars. 
 
 88. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 105TH CONG., TAX AMNESTY 11 (Comm. Print 1998) 
(explaining that once a government institutes a tax amnesty, taxpayers may harbor the expectation that 
future amnesties will be forthcoming). 
 89. See generally William M. Parle & Mike W. Hirlinger, Evaluating the Use of Tax Amnesty by 
State Governments, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 246 (1986). 
 90. See, e.g., Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAX 
REV. 535, 556 (1991) (“[R]ecent amnesty programs have been designed to achieve several objectives, 
including: (1) reaping a one-time revenue windfall; (2) increasing future revenues by adding new names 
to the tax rolls; and (3) improving the voluntary tax compliance rate. However, close scrutiny reveals 
that amnesty does not significantly advance these popular objectives.”). 
 91. See Efforts to Reduce Taxpayer Burdens, supra note 82, at 9 (“[I]nstituting one amnesty might 
encourage the belief that the offer would be repeated in the future, leading to noncompliance in the 
interim.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 90, at 562–63 (“Voluntary disclosure can be viewed as merely a 
kind of permanent amnesty policy.”). 
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Furthermore, the application of the voluntary disclosure program at 
one time was narrowly limited to negating criminal exposure; but 
now, with the introduction of the streamlined voluntary disclosure 
program,93 it extends to mitigating civil penalties as well. 
Due to the similarities between tax amnesty programs and the 
voluntary disclosure program, some commentators have labeled the 
latter “pseudo-amnesty” in nature.94 The major distinctions between a 
true amnesty program and the voluntary disclosure program are as 
follows: an amnesty program is generally offered for a short period 
of time and then it lapses, whereas the voluntary disclosure program 
has been in existence in one form or another for more than 100 years; 
amnesty programs generally grant relief related to both civil and 
criminal tax derelictions, whereas the voluntary disclosure program 
has traditionally applied strictly to criminal defalcations; and finally, 
a hallmark of many amnesty programs has been their waiver or 
reduction of interest charges and penalties, but the voluntary 
disclosure program has, until recently, never offered any interest or 
penalty relief.95 
In 2018, the IRS decided once again to overhaul the nation’s 
voluntary disclosure program.96 Section II.A describes the salient 
features of this revised program. Next, Section II.B critiques its 
central features. 
 
 93. Robert S. Steinberg, Features That Distinguish the OVDP and the Streamlined Filing 
Compliance Procedure, 97 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 72, 72 (2016). 
 94. Stephan Michael Brown, One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History of the FBAR Requirement, 
the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for Increased Participation and Future 
Compliance, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 243, 243 (2014) (referring to the OVDP, stating that the IRS “has 
introduced a series of pseudo-amnesty programs”); Hale E. Sheppard, Third Time’s the Charm: 
Government Finally Collects “Willful” FBAR Penalty in Williams, 117 J. TAX’N 319, 330 (2012) (“The 
taxpayer’s success in Williams II, followed by the taxpayer’s defeat in Williams III, will trigger 
additional uncertainty for taxpayers who are currently participating in one of the Service’s 
pseudo-amnesty programs, such as the offshore voluntary disclosure program (OVDP).”). 
 95. See generally Sales and Use Tax Amnesty Program v. Voluntary Disclosure Program, DUFF & 
PHELPS (May 3, 2018), https://www.duffandphelps.com/insights/publications/state-and-local-tax/sales-
and-use-tax-amnesty-program-v-voluntary-disclosure-program [https://perma.cc/Z3QY-UVFP]. 
 96. I.R.S. Mem., supra note 12, at 1. 
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A. Current Features 
To qualify for program participation, as with the prior OVDPs and 
voluntary disclosure programs, interested taxpayers must follow four 
steps. These are enumerated below. 
1. Preclearance 
Step 1 requires the taxpayer to submit a preclearance request.97 
The likely reason that the IRS is adamant that taxpayers make this 
request before a voluntary disclosure submission is that the agency 
wants to ensure that (i) the income in question is from legal sources 
(e.g., not a kickback or drug-related), (ii) the taxpayer is not under 
current criminal investigation, and (iii) the IRS is not already 
auditing the taxpayer or a related party. If a taxpayer’s responses are 
not in order, the taxpayer will not qualify for program participation; 
however, if the taxpayer clears this hurdle (i.e., the IRS Criminal 
Division officially accepts the taxpayer’s application), the taxpayer 
can proceed to the next step.98 
2. Preliminary Acceptance 
Predicated upon having secured preclearance from the IRS 
Criminal Division, Step 2 requires that taxpayers timely supply 
information related to their noncompliance, including a narrative 
providing the facts and circumstances, assets, entities, related parties, 
and any professional advisers involved in the noncompliance.99 The 
IRS apparently uses this information to evaluate the tax returns 
submitted as part of Step 3 in the process. 
 
 97. Id. at 2 (declaring that taxpayer candidates must use a Form 14457 (Voluntary Disclosure 
Practice Preclearance Request and Application)). 
 98. Id. at 3. 
 99. Id. 
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3. Submission of the Corrected or Delinquent Filings 
Step 3 involves an assigned agent requesting corrected or 
delinquent tax returns and the taxpayer responding to and fulfilling 
this request.100 What is uncertain is exactly when participating 
taxpayers must submit amended or delinquent returns and other 
filings; what is clear, however, is that the examiner is supposed to 
conduct a comprehensive audit of all of the taxpayer’s filings. Those 
taxpayers who are not cooperative during their civil examination risk 
the examiner revoking their acceptance into the program. 
4. Look-Back Period and Penalty Computation 
The final step involves an examination of the look-back period and 
penalty computations. Under the revised voluntary disclosure 
program, the IRS’s position is that the look-back period is the shorter 
of (a) the most recent six years, or (b) the period of taxpayer 
noncompliance.101 However, the IRS left itself an enforcement 
hammer: if the taxpayer and auditor are not able to resolve their audit 
adjustment differences, the examiner is granted discretion “to expand 
the scope to include the full duration of noncompliance and may 
assert maximum penalties under the law with the approval of 
management.”102 
Regarding penalty application, the revised voluntary disclosure 
program provides a bifurcated penalty structure. 
i. Tax Deficiency Penalties  
The examiner is supposed to apply the civil fraud penalty (i.e., 
75% of the tax due) to the year with the largest tax liability. 
Furthermore, albeit not stated, it is likely that an accuracy-related 
penalty (currently 20%) will apply to all other years. In the case of 
non-filing, failure to file (currently 5% per month for each month not 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 4. 
 102. I.R.S. Mem., supra note 12, at 4. 
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submitted up to a 25% maximum) and failure to pay (currently 0.5% 
per month for each month not paid up to a 25% maximum) penalties 
will apply.103 
ii. Offshore Tax-Filing Penalties 
In the case of voluntary disclosures involving offshore accounts, a 
“willful” FBAR 50% penalty will apply to the highest aggregate 
balance in all offshore accounts during the six-year look-back 
period.104 In addition, there is a plethora of other penalty provisions 
that may apply to a taxpayer’s circumstances, such as a failure to file 
a Form 5471 (Information Return of U.S. Persons with Respect to 
Certain Foreign Corporations), and the application of these 
provisions are left up to “examiner discretion.”105 
B. Critique 
1. Advantages 
There are numerous advantages associated with the current 
voluntary disclosure program. Among them are its nimbleness, 
balance, and equity. Consider each of these virtues. 
Historically, the voluntary disclosure program has been responsive 
to the evolving tax landscape. Congress has essentially granted the 
Treasury Department unrestrained authority to settle tax 
controversies as it pleases, and the voluntary disclosure program is 
emblematic of this deference.106 The IRS is at liberty to shape and 
mold the program as the agency sees fit. Thus, if one particular facet 
of the program is not working well (e.g., the time limitations 
associated with form submissions prove too generous or too onerous 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 5. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See I.R.C. § 7122(a) (“The Secretary may compromise any civil or criminal case arising under 
the internal revenue laws prior to reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or 
defense . . . .”). 
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to the IRS or participating taxpayers), the agency does not have to 
petition Congress to make a legislative adjustment. Instead, it can 
simply issue a new pronouncement, and, voilà, the change is done.107 
Of course, if a facet of the program is working particularly well (e.g., 
offering a streamlined alternative for non-willful Code violations),108 
such a measure can readily be expanded—again, without seeking 
Congress’s imprimatur or enduring the lengthy vetting process 
commonly associated with the promulgation of Treasury 
regulations.109 
Another positive attribute of the voluntary disclosure program is 
the delicate balance it attempts to strike between competing goals. 
On the one hand, if its participation terms are too lenient (e.g., 
applicable penalties are waived), it might result in otherwise 
compliant taxpayers becoming unmoored from the tethering supplied 
by the Code; on the other hand, if its participation terms are too harsh 
(e.g., applicable penalties eradicate a taxpayer’s entire net worth), the 
program may lose its allure. In light of these opposing concerns, by 
waiving any criminal liability but still imposing stiff (yet not 
draconian) monetary penalties, the current voluntary disclosure 
program seeks to achieve an appealing middle ground. 
In addition to nimbleness and balance, in its present embodiment, 
the current voluntary disclosure program strives to be equitable. For 
those taxpayers who willfully violated their civic tax obligations, the 
penalties are rather severe, albeit participation greatly mitigates the 
possibility that the taxpayer will have to endure the mental anguish 
 
 107. See, e.g., Naftali Z. Dembitzer, Beyond the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998: 
Perceived Abuses of the Treasury Department’s Rulemaking Authority, 52 TAX LAW. 501, 501 (1999) 
(“The authority of the Treasury Department . . . to promulgate regulations is circumscribed by nontax 
legislation. When issuing tax regulations, the Treasury and, by delegation, the Internal Revenue 
Service . . . must comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, providing 
taxpayers with appropriate advance notice and considering comments from the public before issuing 
final regulations, except in limited circumstances.”). 
 108. See IRM 9.5.11.9 (Sept. 17, 2020). 
 109. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance 
with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1157 
(2008) (“Provisions of the APA that impose procedural requirements for agency rulemaking activity 
apply generally to Treasury’s efforts to promulgate rules and regulations interpreting the I.R.C.”). 
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and shame of a possible prison sentence.110 However, in those 
instances in which taxpayers were non-willful in their noncompliance 
(e.g., failing to understand the nature and scope of their filing 
responsibilities), this factor is prioritized and rather modest penalties 
apply as part of the streamlined program (which functions in unison 
with the voluntary disclosure program).111 
2. Disadvantages 
Despite the foregoing advantages associated with the current 
voluntary disclosure program, there are a myriad of disadvantages 
associated with it as well. These disadvantages include admittance 
ambiguity, broad IRS discretionary powers, and a failure to account 
for the prospect of recidivism. Consider each of these weaknesses. 
During its century-old history, one critical issue that has plagued 
the voluntary disclosure program is setting the ground rules for 
taxpayer participation. More specifically, it is unclear when an 
investigation has commenced and program participation is thus 
precluded;112 indeed, even the current rendition of the voluntary 
disclosure program fails to establish clear demarcation lines that 
explicitly spell out exactly when the IRS has begun an 
investigation.113 Due to the ambiguity surrounding program 
 
 110. See IRM 9.5.11.9(3) (Sept. 17, 2020) (“A voluntary disclosure will be considered along with all 
other factors in determining whether criminal prosecution will be recommended. A voluntary disclosure 
does not guarantee immunity from prosecution.”). 
 111. See Steinberg, supra note 93. 
 112. Trattner & Pastor, supra note 35, at 31–32 (listing numerous ambiguities in the IRS standards 
that courts have been tasked to investigate). 
 113. The Internal Revenue Service Manual makes the following declaration: 
A disclosure is timely if it is received before:  
(a)  The IRS has initiated a civil examination or criminal investigation of the 
taxpayer, or has notified the taxpayer that it intends to commence such an 
examination or investigation.  
(b)  The IRS has received information from a third party (e.g., informant, other 
governmental agency, or the media) alerting the IRS to the specific 
taxpayer’s noncompliance.  
(c)  The IRS has acquired information directly related to the specific liability of 
the taxpayer from a criminal enforcement action (e.g., search warrant, grand 
jury subpoena). 
IRM 9.5.11.9(7) (Sept. 17, 2020). 
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participation, many tax scofflaws are wary and, accordingly, would 
rather take their chances of going undetected than seek program 
refuge. In particular, they fear that if the IRS rejects their application 
as being late (i.e., the IRS has already initiated an investigation), their 
compliance efforts might result in making them an audit target when 
their tax shenanigans might otherwise have been overlooked. 
Another problematic aspect of the current voluntary disclosure 
program is that it vests the IRS with a lot of discretion in how the 
agency metes out justice. As evidence of this, consider each of the 
four steps of the current voluntary disclosure program delineated 
supra in Section II.A. As part of Step 1, namely, the preclearance 
process, the IRS screens taxpayer applications and, after a thorough 
vetting, decides whether a particular taxpayer does or does not 
qualify for program participation; unfortunately, there are no 
opportunities to challenge this determination by turning to a 
third-party neutral arbitrator (however, once chosen for program 
participation, a taxpayer can opt out but bears the concomitant risk of 
potential criminal exposure). Step 2 requires that the taxpayer timely 
submit certain information or risk being jettisoned from program 
participation. Step 3 involves the submission of the corrected or 
delinquent filings. During this phase, taxpayers are supposed to 
“promptly and fully cooperate during civil examinations,” or the 
examiner may request that the IRS Criminal Division “revoke 
preliminary acceptance.”114 Step 4 centers on issues pertaining to the 
look-back period and penalty computation. Embedded in the current 
policy is the following statement: where the taxpayer and examiner 
do not reach agreement on the audit adjustments, “the examiner [is 
given] discretion to expand the scope to include the full duration of 
non-compliance and may assert maximum penalties under the law 
with the approval of management.”115 Clearly, when it comes to the 
voluntary disclosure program, the IRS truly enjoys the upper hand. 
 
 114. I.R.S. Mem., supra note 12, at 4. 
 115. Id. 
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A final problem besetting the current voluntary disclosure program 
is the issue of recidivism, which is commonplace in the criminal 
realm. Study after study indicates that, in comparison to the general 
public, people who perpetrate crimes are far more apt to commit 
them in the future.116 The current voluntary disclosure program 
ignores this fact and implicitly assumes that, going forward, 
participating taxpayers will be forthright in their reporting practices. 
This salutary message imparts the following signal to program 
participants: if and when another avenue of tax avoidance becomes 
available (even if it is illegitimate), it might be financially 
worthwhile to undertake it because the voluntary disclosure program 
will always offer possible refuge. 
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Although the current voluntary disclosure program is not broken, it 
could be improved. One of the primary reasons that some taxpayers 
hesitate to participate in the program is that when they learn that it is 
entirely a creation of IRS formulation, they balk, fearing that the 
agency can make up its own rules as a star chamber.117 As such, 
taxpayers legitimately regret that they lack any meaningful recourse 
to challenge outcomes, particularly if they are assigned a rogue IRS 
agent. Furthermore, many taxpayers believe that if their application is 
denied when they seek preclearance approval, they are at great risk of 
being targeted and enduring criminal prosecution.118 
Congress should not take these taxpayer concerns lightly. Given 
the IRS’s limited resources, those taxpayers who recoil at program 
 
 116. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL VIOLENT OFFENDERS 3 (2019) 
(finding that nearly 64% of federal offenders who had been convicted of violent offenses and were 
released in 2005 were rearrested for a new crime or for a violation of their supervision conditions within 
the next eight years, compared to 39.8% of nonviolent offenders who were rearrested). 
 117. See Trattner & Pastor, supra note 35, at 31 (“In fact, the birth of the Policy came to light in what 
appears to be a haphazard series of off-the-cuff [IRS] announcements.”). 
 118. See, e.g., David S. Grossman & Robert M. McCallum, Steps to Reduce Tax and Penalties on 
Nonfilers, 49 TAX’N FOR ACCTS. 337, 338 (1992) (“Practitioners should be aware that the Government 
may attempt to obtain statements or admissions made by the client for use in a criminal prosecution.”). 
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participation may remain undetected; furthermore, even derelict 
taxpayers whose defalcations are discovered may prove difficult to 
prosecute. Though it is not easy to pinpoint exactly how many 
noncompliant taxpayers at any one time are reluctant about or aghast 
at playing strictly by the IRS’s rules, the number is undoubtedly 
large. 
Metaphorically, the voluntary disclosure program should be the 
equivalent of a lighthouse, beckoning wayward taxpayers to find 
their way home. This Part advocates that Congress make the 
lighthouse beam even brighter by codifying the program. 
Codification would weave the program into the Code’s fabric, 
enhancing its visibility, luring additional taxpayers to participate, and 
generating much-needed tax revenue, which would bode well for the 
nation’s financial health. 
A. Codification of the Voluntary Disclosure Program 
As Congress contemplates codifying the voluntary disclosure 
program, it should not attempt to micromanage all of its details. 
Instead, in broad brushstroke, it should set forth certain parameters 
and leave it to the Treasury Department to handle specific details. 
The first part of this legislative exercise would be to institute 
procedural mechanisms that the IRS and taxpayers should follow; the 
second part would be to delineate an appropriate penalty structure. 
1. Procedural Rules 
Congress should institute a set of procedural rules that the IRS and 
taxpayers would have to adhere to, akin to those already in place with 
respect to Tax Court filings.119 Rigid procedural mechanisms work; 
their binary feature (“yes, you met the requirements” or “no, you did 
 
 119. Note that under Code section 7453, Congress permits the U.S. Tax Court to have its own set of 
procedural rules, a right that the court has exercised. Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to 
Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1233 (2008) (“Thus, the 
Tax Court has the statutory authority to prescribe its own procedural rules for both regular and small tax 
cases.”). 
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not meet the requirements”) voids any room for conjecture. Three 
important procedural rules that come to mind are as follows: (a) 
defining when an IRS investigation has commenced, (b) instituting a 
reasonable timetable for when the IRS must respond to a taxpayer’s 
initial entry submission, and (c) establishing a reasonable timetable 
for when qualified taxpayers must submit corrected or delinquent 
returns. 
i. Investigation Commencement Designation 
One of the items that gnaws at taxpayers is the uncertainty of 
knowing whether they qualify for program participation.120 On the 
one hand, taxpayers often recognize the fact that they have 
committed a crime (e.g., hid income in offshore accounts) or 
mistakenly failed to be tax compliant (e.g., forgot to submit certain 
tax information returns such as a Form 5471, which carries steep 
financial penalties);121 on the other hand, they ordinarily have no idea 
whether the IRS has learned of their malfeasance or nonfeasance. For 
many taxpayers, this uncertainty casts a dark shadow: although they 
would like to participate in the voluntary disclosure program, they 
fear that if they make a submission and it is rejected because an 
investigation has already begun, the IRS will have added ammunition 
to target them.122 
To assuage taxpayer concerns, Congress should establish clear 
guidelines of what constitutes an investigation. Although there is no 
one approach, the proposed legislation could read as follows: 
 
 120. See, e.g., Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 




[https://perma.cc/ZT6X-DGB7] (Mar. 4, 2020). 
 121. I.R.C. § 6679(a)(1) (imposing a $10,000 penalty for a filing failure). 
 122. See IRM 9.5.11.9(6) (Sept. 17, 2020). 
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Taxpayers are deemed on actual or constructive notice that 
an investigation has commenced when an audit has begun 
of (a) the taxpayer, (b) a member of the taxpayer’s family 
(defined to include the taxpayer’s spouse, parents, children, 
grandchildren, or siblings), (c) an active business enterprise 
in which the taxpayer owns a ten percent or greater 
ownership stake (after applying the ownership attribution 
rules of Code section 267), or (d) an enterprise or financial 
institution in which the taxpayer passively holds 
investments. 
In the case of (d), an added element could be a declaratory letter 
issued by the IRS instructing the enterprise or financial institution to 
inform investors that the IRS has commenced a formal audit. In 
situations (a)–(d), an audit would be deemed commenced when the 
IRS reaches out to the parties in question using correspondence or 
engaging in a physical inquiry. 
ii. IRS Timetable to Respond 
One of the most anguishing time periods for taxpayers is waiting 
to hear how the IRS will respond to their preclearance submission 
(i.e., whether they qualify for program participation). Not to be 
overly dramatic, but some taxpayers have anecdotally equated this 
waiting period to learning whether the guillotiner will beckon them 
from their cell for execution. Although the IRS needs time to process 
taxpayers’ applications, this procedure should not be elongated.123 
Accordingly, a forty-five-day window seems appropriate; the 
taxpayer in question need not anguish too long, but this window 
would allow enough time for the IRS to scrutinize the taxpayer’s 
submission. The IRS’s failure to respond within this allotted period 
 
 123. I.R.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TDP-2016-30-030, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN OFFSHORE 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE AND PROCESSING EFFORTS 12 (2016) (“[T]he IRS has taken 
nearly two years to complete 20,587 [OVDP] case certifications, with 241 cases taking at least four 
years to complete.”). 
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would result in the agency automatically accepting the candidate into 
the program. 
iii. Timetable to Submit Paperwork 
Once a taxpayer has been accepted, the onus is on the taxpayer to 
present a case establishing why leniency is in order. The time to 
make this presentation should not be open-ended. Instead, Congress 
should provide a three-month window, with permission to extend the 
window a maximum of two more months. Using this time allotment, 
taxpayers can prepare amended or delinquent tax returns and can 
secure the necessary financing to pay taxes, interest, and applicable 
penalties. Taxpayers who fail to make a timely submission would 
risk, at the discretion of the IRS, being ejected from the program. 
2. Penalty Structure 
Once again, Congress should set forth some basic ground rules for 
the appropriate penalty structure and let the Treasury Department fill 
in the particulars. These ground rules should account for the fact that 
willful taxpayers need to be taught a lesson: civil society teeters 
when taxpayers purposefully and strategically do not fulfill their 
tax-filing obligations, putting critical public institutions (e.g., the 
military and the judicial system) at risk of financial collapse.124 
Furthermore, even when taxpayers’ actions are non-willful, civil 
society is jeopardized if taxpayers do not learn and adhere to tax 
compliance rules.125 Finally, taxpayers who participate in the 
voluntary disclosure program should know that they must learn from 
their mistakes; accordingly, those taxpayers who participate should 
be precluded from doing so again in another voluntary disclosure 
program. Thus, the ground rules for setting forth a penalty structure 
 
 124. See Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Taxes are what we pay for civilized society . . . .”). 
 125. See generally Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 
(1996). 
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should take into account these three factors: (a) willfulness, 
(b) non-willfulness, and (c) potential for recidivism. 
i. Willfulness  
Because Congress does not know nor can it anticipate the future 
tax shenanigans that taxpayers might undertake, it cannot set a 
concrete penalty structure in place for program participants. Instead, 
it should declare that program participants have an option: once they 
enter the program and negate potential criminal liability, they can opt 
out of the program and be penalized under existing penalty 
provisions; alternatively, they can accept whatever penalty structure 
the IRS has put in place to attract program participants.126 
Congress should add a provision that willful taxpayers who seek to 
circumvent program participation by making so-called quiet 
disclosures—whereby taxpayers submit one or more tax returns to 
the IRS through normal submission channels without acknowledging 
any guilt for their defalcations—are precluded from program 
participation.127 Furthermore, the fact that they chose this route to 
hide their derelictions may constitute additional evidence of their 
efforts to cover up their crimes.128 
ii. Non-Willfulness 
Taxpayers who mistakenly fail to fulfill their civic obligations are 
not without culpability.129 Often, they are remiss, negligent, or 
 
 126. See 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure FAQs, supra note 120. 
 127. See, e.g., Remy Farag, HSBC Client Prosecuted After Quiet Disclosure, 22 J. INT’L TAX’N 8, 8–
9 (2011) (noting that quiet disclosures may constitute evidence that taxpayers are seeking to hide their 
prior actions). 
 128. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 74, at 3–4 (“Those taxpayers making ‘quiet’ disclosures 
should be aware of the risk of being examined and potentially criminally prosecuted for all applicable 
years.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, Viewing CERCLA As Creating an Option on the Marginal Firm: 
Does It Encourage Irresponsible Environmental Behavior?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 48 (1991) 
(“[C]ourts have moved from a standard requiring direct personal participation to a standard that includes 
broadly defined forms of culpable nonfeasance. Thus, a corporation that does not have established 
corporate policies against illegal releases, backed by proper lines of authority, communication, and 
monitoring, may find that its chief officers, managers, and even controlling shareholders are personally 
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unwilling to invest the time and resources necessary to fulfill their 
civic obligations. Yet, by societal standards, nonfeasance is deemed 
less heinous than malfeasance.130 Thus, as part of the codification 
process, Congress should require that the IRS institute a second tier 
to the penalty structure that is less onerous than the penalty structure 
in place for willful taxpayers.131 
iii. Potential for Recidivism 
When it comes to the commission of crimes, those who perpetrate 
them are apt to do so again.132 In recognition of this, Congress should 
add a provision that taxpayers can only participate in the voluntary 
disclosure program on a one-time basis, regardless of whether their 
actions are willful or non-willful. By engrafting such a provision to 
the voluntary disclosure program, taxpayers would be on notice not 
to be enticed by the siren calls of future shady tax arrangements or 
not to give only secondary attention to their tax-filing obligations. 
The voluntary disclosure program should reflect magnanimity on the 
part of Congress. However, it should be a one-time source of refuge 
for taxpayers who, during life’s journey, lose their way; it should not 
be a comfort blanket for those who periodically get cold feet when 
their felonious tax dealings go south or for those who routinely take 
their tax-filing obligations for granted. 
 
liable for all CERCLA violations.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Singleton v. City of Hamilton, 515 N.E.2d 8, 12 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (“[A] municipal 
corporation is not generally liable for nonfeasance.”); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44 (1953) 
(“To impose liability for the alleged nonfeasance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the United 
States liable in tort for failure to impose a quarantine for, let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth 
disease.”). 
 131. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 143 (2012) (“[The IRS 
should expand] and clarify the Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative to encourage all benign actors 
(including U.S. residents and those owing more than $1,500) to correct past noncompliance using less 
burdensome procedures that do not unnecessarily drain IRS enforcement resources (e.g., expand and 
clarify who qualifies for it and further explain who will be deemed to have reasonable cause for failure 
to file an FBAR).”). 
 132. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 116. 
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B. Critique 
There is a reason that the IRS has never been a proponent of 
codifying the voluntary disclosure program. The agency fears that 
codification might send a loud and potentially dangerous message to 
tax scofflaws that there is always an opportunity to make amends, 
thereby undermining the serious nature of tax transgressions.133 More 
specifically, unabashed risk-takers could consider this absolution 
opportunity as a signal that they can go about their merry way and 
likely find salvation in the voluntary disclosure program if they ever 
learn that the IRS is clamping down in general or scrutinizing 
particular industries. Also, with institutionalization, the IRS could 
potentially abuse the process as well.134 
But the proposed codification proposal is not intended to constitute 
a bright red neon sign declaring to program participants that “all is 
forgiven.” Instead, although the proposed program embodies the 
principle of clemency and recognizes the human propensity to make 
mistakes, it attaches serious financial consequences and other 
repercussions to program participation. 
As discussed infra, aside from the potential revenue that the 
program is apt to generate, codification provides a host of other 
benefits, including the following: a formal recognition that taxpayer 
redemption is possible, a working procedure for the IRS and 
taxpayers alike to follow, and a penalty structure that is sensitive to 
culpability and factors in the opportunity to diminish recidivism. 
 
 133. See Gerald P. Moran, Tax Amnesty: An Old Debate As Viewed from Current Public Choices, 1 
FLA. TAX REV. 307, 325 (1993) (“A policy of tax amnesty, despite the recent changes in the agency 
discussed above, remains antithetical to the purpose for which the Service was created and the interests 
of its careerist members who have a vital stake in the continuation of past practices.”); SEC’Y OF THE 
TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY 
DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 91 (1984) (stating the Treasury Department’s opposition to a 
federal amnesty program); Douglas, supra note 82 (suggesting that federal tax amnesty will not resolve 
the country’s fiscal problems). 
 134. Ross, supra note 25, at 151 (“Critics argued that an official voluntary disclosure provision, by its 
nature, encourages corrupt administration by Service agents who can ‘tip off’ a tax evader that an 
investigation is about to begin.”); David R. Burton, The Tax Amnesty Issue Dictates Patience, 22 TAX 
NOTES 1369, 1370 (1984) (reporting instances of IRS agents who falsified written documentation of 
voluntary disclosure on behalf of taxpayers who actually had not disclosed until after an investigation 
had commenced). 
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No one should underestimate the importance of Congress giving 
its imprimatur to the voluntary disclosure program. This overture 
would comfort taxpayers who sought to reform their ways (including 
those who, in the past, were malevolent, negligent, or remiss in the 
handling of their federal tax obligations). No longer would the 
voluntary disclosure program remain an obscure part of pseudo law, 
buried deep within the Internal Revenue Service Manual,135 
inaccessible to most taxpayers and even the vast majority of tax 
professionals. Instead, a simple Google query would reveal that 
Congress had endorsed the voluntary disclosure program and its use 
by taxpayers. 
Another important feature of codification is that it would provide a 
step-by-step procedural framework and a penalty structure sensitive 
to culpability. Procedural institutionalization would have a twofold 
effect: first, it would possibly reduce the number of litigated cases 
surrounding the issue of when an IRS investigation had been deemed 
to have commenced;136 second, it would provide both the IRS and 
taxpayers with clear timetables detailing when various paperwork 
submissions had to be made.137 Having a multitier penalty structure 
versus a one-size-fits-all approach would demonstrate that not all tax 
transgressions are of the same ilk—to the contrary, some are far more 
heinous than others, and “justice” should be meted out 
accordingly.138 
A final attribute of codification would be the premium it places on 
an appropriate and effective penalty structure. As a general axiom, all 
humans make mistakes; some learn from these experiences, and 
others do not. In the case of the former, the voluntary disclosure 
program offers salvation; in the case of the latter, the incorrigibles 
will confront the consequences. Consider those criminals who, as 
part of a plea bargain, secure significantly reduced prison sentences 
or, alternatively, are entirely absolved of their crimes. If they 
 
 135. See IRM 9.5.11.9.1 (Sept. 17, 2020). 
 136. See id. at 9.5.11.9.7. 
 137. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 138. See supra Section III.A.2. 
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subsequently commit another crime, prosecutors, per tradition, will 
go after them with a vengeance.139 Incorporating the one-time 
opportunity feature into the voluntary disclosure program 
appropriately addresses the redemption/recidivism issue: on the one 
hand, anchored in the Judeo–Christian–Islamic spirit, Congress can 
demonstrate forgiveness by enabling taxpayers to avail themselves of 
the voluntary disclosure program; on the other hand, its magnanimity 
should not be taken for granted. 
The virtues associated with the codification of the voluntary 
disclosure program are clear. With respect to those taxpayers who 
seek to cleanse their souls, the Treasury Department will capture 
more tax revenue, the need for the IRS to pursue criminal 
prosecutions will be obviated, and the agency will be at liberty to 
dedicate its limited resources to those recalcitrant taxpayers who 
obstinately and irredeemably fail to pay their taxes or fulfill their 
other tax-filing obligations. Were all these outcomes to come to 
fruition, the voluntary disclosure program would be a model for state 
revenue agencies,140 and other industrialized countries,141 to emulate. 
CONCLUSION 
The voluntary disclosure program has a long and successful 
history of augmenting tax compliance in the United States. There are 
several metrics that evidence this point: during the past century, 
thousands of participants have shed their noncompliance status, the 
 
 139. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the 
Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 447 (2011) (“Finally, repeat offenders do worse at 
sentencing than first-time offenders as well and not only because of recidivist sentencing schemes, 
mandatory minimums, and career criminal statutes. Even absent any statutory or guideline mandate, 
judges are far more likely to impose harsher sentences on repeat criminals than on first-timers.”). 
 140. For example, New York already has a comprehensive voluntary disclosure program in place. See 
Voluntary Disclosure and Compliance Program, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN., 
https://www.tax.ny.gov/enforcement/vold/ [https://perma.cc/PK4S-PUS7] (May 17, 2019). 
 141. For example, Canada already has a voluntary disclosure program in place. See Disclosures 
Program—Introduction, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/programs/about-
canada-revenue-agency-cra/voluntary-disclosures-program-overview.html [https://perma.cc/C33N-
Q3UR] (May 29, 2020). 
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program has raised billions of dollars in additional revenue, and 
program participation not only has enabled erstwhile derelict 
taxpayers to sleep at night knowing that their sins have been absolved 
but also has permitted them to become productive members of the 
taxpaying community.142 Few other federal programs boast such 
accolades. 
Despite these successes, the voluntary disclosure program requires 
greater transparency. Codification would achieve this objective and, 
by doing so, increase program participation, raise additional revenue, 
and help prevent the IRS from having to undertake labor-intensive 
tax criminal cases. 
Like any legislation, the codification of the voluntary disclosure 
program would not be without its issues. In particular, the IRS could 
no longer respond as rapidly as it did in the past to the ever-changing 
economic and technological landscape; instead, going forward, it 
would potentially have to petition Congress to institute necessary 
reform measures. However, on the whole, the advantages associated 
with codification far outweigh the disadvantages. 
That being the case, Congress should act expeditiously and make 
codification of the voluntary disclosure program a top priority. The 
message associated with codification would be simple: shouldering 
one’s appropriate tax burden is a civic duty; if you have failed to do 
so, the nation’s legislative branch offers a remedial means for you to 
be a productive and compliant member of society again. Said 
somewhat differently, formally incorporating the voluntary 
disclosure program into the Code would function as an inviting 
doormat of sorts, welcoming wayward taxpayers back home again. 
 
 142. See supra Section II.B. 
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20% 25% 27.5% 27.5%149 
 
 143. This table is from a GAO report but modified by the author to include the 2014 column 
information. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 9. 
 144. The IRS granted a one-time extension of the original September 23, 2009 deadline for certain 
voluntary disclosures. Id. Those taxpayers had until October 15, 2009. Id. 
 145. The 2012 OVDP had no set deadline for taxpayers to apply. Id. Additionally, the IRS stated that 
the terms of the program could change at any time. Id. For example, the IRS could increase penalties 
associated with the program for all or some taxpayers or a defined class of taxpayers, or it could decide 
to end the program at any point. Id. 
 146. Tax years covered are determined by the last closed tax year when the taxpayers apply to the 
program, plus the seven previous tax years. Id. 
 147. Tax years covered are determined by the last closed tax year when the taxpayers apply to the 
program, plus the seven previous tax years. Id. 
 148. The offshore penalty rate is applied to the highest aggregate account balance during the calendar 
years that correspond to the tax years covered by the program. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
supra note 9. 
 149. The IRS increased this penalty to 50% in instances when the taxpayer had invested in certain 
“bad banks” known as foreign facilitators. Id. A list of such institutions is available on the IRS website. 
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Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-
businesses/foreign-financial-institutions-or-facilitators [https://perma.cc/VDQ2-RKG5] (June 11, 2020). 
 150. A 5% penalty rate was generally allowed if taxpayers did not open or cause the account to be 
opened, had no account use, and had paid all applicable U.S. taxes on funds deposited to the accounts, 
with only account earnings having escaped U.S. taxation. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra 
note 9. In later program years, minimal account activity was allowed, for example, to update address 
information or to withdraw a minimal amount of funds, defined as less than $1,000 in any program year 
for which the taxpayer was noncompliant. Id. This limit did not include transfers back to the United 
States upon closing an offshore account. Id. 
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